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Abstract:
Game theory is used to rationally and dispassionately examine the strategic behaviour of nations,
especially superpower behaviour. This article explains how basic game theory - at its simplest
level - was used by Anatol Rapoport to generate ideas about how to enhance world peace.
Rapoport was at the forefront of the game theoreticians who sought to conceptualize strategies
that could promote international cooperation. Accordingly, the basic logic of game theory is
explained using the game models of ‘Chicken’ and ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. These models were
used by Rapoport in his books and lectures in simple and complex ways. Then Rapoport’s
revolutionary ideas about how to promote international and national cooperation are overviewed.
He developed a simple strategy called Tit for Tat which won two computer tournaments. He
suggested that applying his strategy to real-life problems could help prevent human vulnerability
and minimize conflict. Finally, this essay considers the inherent dangers of game theory and
nuclear deterrence as Rapoport taught scholars to contemplate their risks.
Keywords: chicken game, cooperation, game theory, peace research, Prisoner’s Dilemma,
Rapoport
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Introduction
Game theory was developed in the 1940s and 1950s to rationally and dispassionately examine
the strategic behaviour of nations, especially superpower behaviour. Game models are used to
describe and explain all types of situations, as well as to prescribe how rational leaders or
countries should act in given situations. Economists have their own models of supply and
demand and, similarly scientists and political analysts often use game theoretical models to
understand the underlying structure of conflict. Dr. Rapoport’s contributions to game theory
were solidly in the areas of peace and conflict studies or peace research, two important sub-fields
of political science and international relations. Rapoport was a recognized leader in peace and
conflict research world-wide. He was particularly well-known as one who was also highly
respected in the military and strategic studies community.

Dr. Anatol Rapoport was born May 22, 1911 in Lozovaya (Russia) and died on January 20,
2007, nearly a decade ago. He went to school in Chicago and afterwards studied music in Vienna
from 1929 to 1934. Until 1937 he was active as an international concert pianist and even in his
later years as his memory waned, he could play the piano beautifully from memory. He began a
second study in mathematics at the University of Chicago (PhD in Mathematics, 1941). After
military service Rapoport began his scientific career and research at the Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago, in 1946. From 1955 to 1970 Rapoport was professor at the Mental Health
Institute of the University of Michigan. In 1970 he transferred as a professor of psychology and
mathematics to the University of Toronto. He became the director of the Institute for Advanced
Studies, Vienna in 1980. Rapoport moved back to Canada in 1984 where he was a long-serving
professor at the University of Toronto, the co-founder of its Peace and Conflict Studies Program,
and president of a wellknown society that continues to debate, “Science for Peace”.

Known worldwide as one of game theory’s most pre-eminent theorists, Rapoport published m
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more than 400 contributions to game theory, mathematical biology, semantics, systems theory
and peace research. He wrote two classic works: Fights, games and debates (1961) and
Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (1965), and he wrote and edited many
other books on game theory, the best known of which are: N-person game theory: concepts and
applications (1970); The big two: Soviet-American perceptions of foreign policy (1971); Conflict
in man-made environment (1974); Game theory as a theory of conflict resolution (1974); The 2 X
2game (1976); Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (1983); and Decision
theory and decision behaviour: normative and descriptive approaches (1989). Later in life,
Rapoport contributed two seminal volumes to peace research: The Origins of Violence:
Approaches to the Study of Conflict (1989) and Peace: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (1992).
These ground-breaking texts continued to be used by students and scholars in the University of
Toronto’s program of Peace and Conflict Studies, which Dr. Rapoport co-founded, and they are
still used in many other specialized peace and conflict studies programs.

With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system, game theory lost much of
its former popularity (McMillan, 1992; Powell, 1999) although it continues to preoccupy
scholars and educators. Scholars note the distinction between non-cooperative and cooperative
game theory (the former assumes individual decision making without binding contracts while
the latter is about coalition formation and negotiations). Essentially this article explains to
educators how basic game theory - at its simplest level - was used by Rapoport to generate ideas
about how to enhance world peace. Rapoport was at the forefront of those game theoreticians
who sought to propose alternative ways to conceptualize strategies that could promote
international cooperation - he is known for contributing cooperative solutions to non-cooperative
game theory. Many of his books on game theory are difficult to understand from a mathematical
perspective, but he believed the basic lessons of game theory could be taught to everyone using
chalk and a blackboard. One of my fond memories is of Professor Rapoport standing in front of
the classroom at the University of Toronto, donning a snappy blue beret, surrounded by clouds of
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chalk dust. He often drew the essential boxes that make up a matrix in game theory with so much
vigour that his piece of chalk would break. Already in his eighties, he continued to teach parttime decades after official retirement.

The basic logic of game theory is explained in this commemorative essay using two game
models: Chicken and Prisoner’s Dilemma. These models were used by Rapoport in his books in
complex and sophisticated ways. But in order to better appreciate Rapoport’s fine contribution to
peace studies and/or those less well versed in mathematics, they are explained herein as he
explained them during his first few lectures in the classroom.

Then Rapoport’s revolutionary ideas about how to promote international and national
cooperation are overviewed. He remains well-known nearly a decade after his death because he
developed a simple game theoretical concept, called Tit for Tat (TFT) which won two famous
computer tournaments. He suggested that applying TFT to real-life problems could help
formulate preventive measures that reduce human vulnerability and minimize conflict.

Finally, the essay reflects upon the inherent dangers of game theory and nuclear deterrence just
as Dr. Rapoport taught many scholars to contemplate their risks. He felt very responsible to
counsel students and scholars of game theory to be careful about wielding game theory’s arcane
language for nefarious ends.

Game 1: ‘Chicken’ or Deterrence Model
It is helpful to first explain the concepts of a ‘matrix’, and a ‘payoff’ with reference to the
game of Chicken. The Chicken model was often used to illustrate the logic - or illogic - of
deterrence strategy; however, it is also useful for explaining the basic logic of game theory and
the ‘minimax’ principle. The model was based on a daredevil game played by teenagers in the
United States. Two groups would pile into cars and drive full-speed at each other with their cars
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straddling the middle of the road. The first driver to swerve to avoid collision would be the loser,
earning the nickname ‘chicken’. But both drivers would be losers if they collided.
Chicken did not appear until the mid-1960s, and it is interesting that its sources were not
nuclear planners, but two noted peace activisits, Bertrand Russell and Anatol Rapoport. In 1957
Russell used the teenage dare as an analogy for the arms race, and in 1965 Rapoport defined
Chicken as the now-familiar 2 X 2 matrix. As Rapoport explained in his lectures, Chicken was
used by Daniel Ellsberg, a strategic analyst at RAND, the American think-tank to create a
‘machine’ for asking useful questions and for preliminary testing of alleged answers about
nuclear deterrence. The model was based on a daredevil game played by teenagers in the United
States. Two groups would pile into cars and drive full-speed at each other with their cars
straddling the middle of the road. The first driver to swerve to avoid collision would be the loser,
earning the nickname ‘chicken’. But both drivers would be losers if they collided.
The choices that face both drivers - Rapoport called them Sam and Ivan - can be
illustrated using a rectangular box called a matrix. Sam’s choices are listed in the horizontal
rows, while Ivan’s choices are ordered in the columns vertically. In the simple two-player game
of Chicken, Sam and Ivan each has two choices - to swerve or not to swerve - but there are four
possible outcomes and four possible ‘payoffs’ for each player. A payoff is defined as the
outcome of both players’ decisions (insert Figure 1).
Figure 1
“Chicken” or Deterrence Game

Ivan (column)
Don’t Swerve (threaten)

Swerve (cooperate)

Sam
(row)

+1

Swerve
(cooperate)

+1
Don’t Swerve
(threaten)

+10
-10

-10
+10

-100
-100
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To illustrate, let us assign some numbers for the possible payoffs for Sam and Ivan, and examine
these payoffs closely:
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1.

If Sam decides to swerve off the road at the last second - but so does Ivan - both will be
seen by their friends as lacking in courage - as ‘chickens’. But they do earn some status at
least for playing the game - so we will give them each a single point (upper-left box)

2.

If Sam swerves, and Ivan does not, then Sam looks like a chicken - in this case the payoff
for Sam would be -10 points - and Ivan wins - let us say this is worth +10 points to him
(upper-right box).

3.

However, if Sam decides not to swerve, and Ivan swerves, Sam earns +10 points, and
Ivan receives - 10 points (lower-left box).

4.

But if both Sam and Ivan decide not to swerve, the rather grisly outcome could be
calculated as - 100 points for Sam, and - 100 points for Ivan (lower-right box).

Evidently, the game of chicken was meant to mirror the calculations that the superpowers
made about nuclear deterrence. In a situation of deterrence, both the United States and the Soviet
Union could threaten to ‘go to the brink’ and use nuclear weapons. But if neither backed down,
there would be a nuclear war and both players would suffer enormous costs. The costs of playing
the ‘game’ of deterrence would outweigh the benefits of going to the brink.
In this sort of situation, what might Sam or Ivan decide to do? According to traditional
game theory, Sam should make his decision by considering all the worst possible consequences
of each of his choices. Then he should choose so as to avoid the worst conceivable outcome. In
game theory this course of action was referred to as the ‘minimax’ or the ‘maximin’ principle (or
the von Neumann principle). Sam should look for the payoff where his minimal payoff is
maximal - in other words, he should try to make the best of the worst behaviour of his opponent.
As Dr. Rapoport pointed out, if both Sam and Ivan choose according to the maximin
principle, they would both decide to swerve in order to avoid the worst pay-off - a perfectly
rational solution. Similarly, game theorists pointed out that in a crisis situation, the enormous
costs for the United States and the Soviet Union of carrying out a strategy of Mutual Assured
Destruction (MAD) would not be borne by rational decision-makers. Thus, MAD would not be
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perceived by either side as a credible strategy of conflict avoidance because the costs of possible
nuclear war far outweighed the benefits of going to the brink and threatening possible retaliation.
Moreover, if MAD was not seen as credible, the Soviet Union might threaten a conventional or
limited nuclear attack against Western Europe, knowing full well that the United States would
back down because of the enormous costs of all-out nuclear retaliation. The problem, then, for
game theoreticians became how to signal that the American nuclear threat was credible - that the
United States would risk some measure of destruction, for example, for the sake of Berlin, Korea,
or Cuba.
A few solutions to this conceptual conundrum emerged from game theory. As Rapoport
pithily explained, the famous nuclear strategist Herman Kahn advised the following winning
strategy: in full view of the opponent, tear off the steering wheel and throw it away. In this
manner, the opponent will become convinced of your resolve, for now he knows that you could
not swerve even if you wanted to. Taking this line of reasoning one step further, Kahn
recognized that just as Sam, showing his resolve, yanks his steering wheel off, Ivan might get the
same idea and do the same thing, creating a problem for both parties. As Rapoport explains, “If
one remembers that it is not only the two imbeciles’ lives that are put on the line in the global
game of chicken but practically everyone else’s, one begins to realize the dangers involved in
indulging in strategic analysis from only one strategist’s point of view” (1971:180-81; 1985: 17981). The basic question - how to credibly threaten to go the brink - continues to preoccupy game
theorists concerned with making deterrence work (for example, Brams and Kilgour, 1988;
Powell, 1990; Paul et. al 2009). But Rapoport was at the forefront of those who forthrightly
argued that “this fixation on the zero-sum paradigm, together with the inability to break away
from the imperatives of individual rationality, prevent the military from designing a way out of
the impasse created by the threat of total extinction” (1985: 180).

Deterrence and the Intellectual Poverty of Signalling Resolve in the Chicken Model
The problem of how to signal resolve in a nuclear deterrence situation will probably
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never be solved. How should the United States signal to an adversary, for example, that if it
attacks - using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons - that the US may use its nuclear
weapons? Nevertheless, game theoreticians have gone to great lengths to try to derive gametheoretical solutions to the problem. Rather than admit that the strategy of nuclear deterrence
should be reexamined and revised, game theorists experimented with many possible solutions to
the problem.
It was evident in his classes that Rapoport had little patience with the work by
theoreticians who tried to formulate complex concepts (e.g. ‘robust threats’, ‘probabilistic
doomsday machine’) and mathematical proofs (e.g. ‘backward induction’, ‘conditional
probability’) to show that it can be rational, in certain circumstances, to issue a nuclear threat
(Brams and Kilgour, 1988: 38-53, 74-94). While game theorists’ attention shifted to modelling
nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability, including the effects of first-strike
advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on
the dynamics of escalation, (for example, Harvey, 1997) Rapoport broadened his academic focus
to write books that explained theories of peace research, the origins of violence, and ideas about
semantics and systems theory. He continued to publish extensive research on game theory but he
embraced the game of ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, rather than ‘Chicken’, in books like Prisoner’s
Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (1965); The 2 X 2 Game (1976); and
Mathematical Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (1983). His major contributions to
game theory revolve around the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) model because it reveals, in
devastatingly clear terms, the underlying structural conflict that bedevils most systemic-, state-,
and individual- level conflicts.

Game 2: ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ Model
Rapoport used the Prisoner’s Dilemma game to neatly demonstrate how humans and
natons can get into threatening sorts of situations - and how the structure of a situation can force
everyone to continue to endure insecurity. The Prisoner’s Dilemma model demonstrates that we
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can be caught in a dilemma, not because of evil or stupid leaders, but because of structural
imperatives and thinking patterns that dictate choices where, in order to avoid the worst-case
scenario, we end up in a less-than-optimal situation. In his own words, “In the game called
Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rational choice of strategy by both players leads to an outcome which is
worse for both than if they had chosen their strategies ‘irrationally’. The paradox remains
unresolved as long as we insist on adhering to the concept of rationality which makes perfect
sense in zero-sum games but which makes questionable sense in non-zero-sum games. Thus the
paradox forces a reexamination of our concept of rational decision” (Rapoport and Chammah,
1965: 13).
As Rapoport liked to explain in his classes, the original story of Prisoner’s Dilemma was
formulated in the early 1950s, and the problem it poses continues to preoccupy policy-makers
and academics who think about decision-making. The parable goes something like this:
Two suspects are taken into custody and placed in separate cells. The prosecutor is
convinced that they are guilty of a specific crime but he does not have sufficient evidence to
convict them at a trial. Accordingly, he gives each prisoner two alternatives : to confess - or not to
confess - to the crime he is sure they have committed. He tells each of them:
“If you do not confess - if you are silent - I will book you on the lesser charge of illegal
possession of a weapon. You will get a sentence of 1 year in jail.”
“But,” he says to each of them separately, “if you both confess - if you both defect - I will
prosecute you both but I will recommend less than the most severe sentence - probably each of
you will be sent to jail for 5 years”.
Then the prosecutor goes on to say, “However, if one of you confesses and the other does
not, then he who confesses will get lenient treatment because he provided us with evidence - only
3 months in jail - and I promise that the other prisoner, who does not confess and stays silent,
will receive the maximum sentence - at least 10 years.”
The choices facing each prisoner can be illustrated using a matrix. At this point, Rapoport
would give the prisoners the names of two erstwhile students in the classroom, but for the sake of
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clarity here, we will call them Arnold (A) and Bob (B). If we examine how Arnold (A) reasons,
we can obtain insights into the way in which leaders, groups, nations, and international
organizations can also find themselves in a Prisoner’s Dilemma (insert Figure 2).
Figure 2
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Arnold and Bob in Jail

Bob (B)
Cooperate (silence = C)
Cooperate
(silence = C)

B gets 1 year
(-10)
Both silent
(C, C)

Arnold (A)

A gets 1 year
(-10)
Defect
(confess = D)

B gets 10 years
(-100)
Arnold confesses,
Bob is silent
(D, C)
A gets 3 months
(-3)

Defect (confess = D)
B gets 3 months

Bob confesses,
Arnold is silent
(C, D)
A gets 10 years
(-100)
Bob gets 5 years
(-50)
Both confess
(D, D)
A gets 5 years
(-50)

-3 = ‘best’, most-preferred outcome
-10 = ‘next best’ or next-preferred outcome
-50 = ‘next worst’ outcome
-100 = ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome

Arnold’s Choices: Sitting Alone in Prison
Obviously, Arnold does not know what Bob is planning to do, nor can he communicate
with him from his prison cell, so he calculates as follows:
If I choose to be silent, and Bob does too, we will both get 1 year in jail (C,C box)
1.

But if I am silent, and Bob confesses, then I get 10 years, and he gets only 3 months
(C, D box)

2.

If I confess, and Bob does not, then I get only 3 months, and he gets 10 years (D, C box)
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3.

But if we both confess, then we both get 5 years (D, D box).

Thus, says Arnold to himself, if I want to avoid the worst outcome - that is 10 years - then I
should not risk being silent. I should confess because the worst that can happen is that I get 5
years, and I might get only 3 months.
This is Arnold’s reasoning (based on the maximin principle ). But, unfortunately, Bob
makes the same calculations. Bob also chooses to confess so as to avoid the worst-case outcome
so both Arnold and Bob spend 5 years in prison - a sad ending to a metaphorical tale.
The principal lesson of Prisoner’s Dilemma is that - despite the existence of a mutually
preferable outcome (the CC box) - the rational calculations of both prisoners in favour of their
own self-interest in avoiding the worst-case outcome dictates that both end up worse-off. The
appeal of Prisoner’s Dilemma lies in the fact that its underlying logic can apply to a wide variety
of threatening situations. For example, the matrix below demonstrates the same kinds of
calculations leading to an arms race (insert Figure 3).
Figure 3
An Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma

Country B
Cooperate (low arms spending)
Cooperate
(low arms spending = C)

Country B
disadvantage
(-10)
(C, C)
Arms Limitation

Country A
Country A
Disadvantage
(-10)
Defect
(confess = D)

Defect (high arms spending)
Country B
Advantage
(+50)
(C, D)

Country A
Serious disadvantage
(-100)
Country B
serious disadvantage
(-100)
(D, C)

Country A

Country B
(-50)
(D, D)
Arms Race
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Advantage
(+50)

Country A
(-50)

+50 = ‘best’, most-preferred outcome
-10 = ‘next best’ or next-preferred outcome
-50 = ‘next worst’ outcome
-100 = ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome

In this game, Country A would most prefer a situation where it has a superior weapons
system to Country B. For instance, the superior weapons system could be advanced nuclear
submarine technology or a sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system based in space. However,
Country B sees a situation where Country A has superior firepower as its worst-case scenario;
consequently, it develops its own weapons. These could be modernized anti-submarine warfare
systems or thousands of decoys designed to trick tracking systems, satellites, and lasers in space.
As a result, both countries become entangled in an arms race, although the costs of an arms race
are higher than agreeing to some sort of arms limitation agreement.
It should be pointed out that in this simple Prisoner’s Dilemma model, the two players
need not be the obvious ones - the United States versus Russia. The parties could be India versus
Pakistan; North Korea versus South Korea and Japan; or al Qaeda’s network versus the United
States and the NATO allies. Prisoner’s Dilemma also describes many conceivable scenarios other
than arms races. The choices facing Group A or Group B could be between:


cooperating with other countries to impose sanctions against a violator country (e.g.
cooperating to impose sanctions on Iran) - or defecting from an international agreement to
impose sanctions (e.g. loosening trade restrictions with Iran’s military regime).



cooperating with other countries to limit weapons stockpiles (e.g. ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) - or choosing to export certain weapon systems (e.g.
modernizing NATO’s ‘dual-use’ weapons systems in Turkey)

Prisoner’s Dilemma can apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as businesses
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cooperating together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, governments seeking to control
landmines, or the United Nations (UN) attempting to mobilize member states for peace support
operations. The choices could be between:


cooperating with an adversary to reduce forces and military equipment, such as cooperating
with Russia to reduce NATO’s weapons arsenal in Europe - or reneging from serious arms
limitation talks, such as failing to honour the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty



cooperating with the general trends of arms control agreements, such as honouring the as-yetunratified Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty - or choosing to modernize nuclear weapon
systems, such as making plans to erect ground- and space-based ballistic missile defence
systems and modernizing nuclear weapons arsenals



cooperating with adversaries to negotiate peace agreements, such as cooperating among the
NATO allies and Russia in order to pursue peace negotiations about how to deal with armed
rebel groups in Ukraine’s eastern area – or choosing not to negotiate peace agreements about
how to deal with armed rebel groups, including for example rejecting the prospect of peace
negotiations about how to deal with ISIS in Syria and Iraq among the NATO allies including
with Russia and Syria’s pro-Assad forces.

In all these cases there are great advantages to being the only one to defect, however, if both or
all parties defect, it works out to everyone’s disadvantage. Thus, Prisoner’s Dilemma starkly
illustrates how spirals of insecurity can develop. It shows how parties can be trapped in security
dilemmas - not because of stupid or irrational calculations - but because of thinking patterns or
‘decision rules’ where each group seeks to avoid the worst-case scenario at all costs, and where
each player is unwilling to risk the costs of cooperating if the other player also does not
cooperate.

II. Rapoport’s Contribution to Cooperative Game Theory
A great deal of scholarly work tests the intricacies of the Chicken and Prisoner’s
Dilemma games. For example, Jurišić et al., after reviewing the relevant literature up to 2012,
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concluded “Prisoner’s dilemma is still a current research area with nearly 15,000 papers during
the past two years.” (Jurišić M, Kermek D, Konecki M, 2012; quoted in Rapoport, Seale and
Coleman, 2015). Rapoport believed a basic understanding of both models’ underlying logic
could help devise creative strategies to promote international cooperation. As he repeatedly
showed, a game theoretical framework can help generate useful ideas and unusual solutions that
enhance human security. Taking a simple approach could help generate solutions and detect
problems with these same ideas. His concept of ‘Tit for Tat’ was a very simple idea, yet it
generated some amazing discoveries.

Game 3: Rapoport’s strategy of ‘Tit for Tat’ (TFT)
In his lectures, Rapoport explained the idea that costs and benefits need not be one-time
pay-offs, but can be incurred or appreciated more than once over time. As he would ask, what
happens if we play Prisoner’s Dilemma over and over again? In other words, what happens if two
players know that they will interact repeatedly? In game theory, this is referred to as an ‘iterated’
Prisoner’s Dilemma.
To answer this question, political scientist Robert Axelrod invited experts to submit
programs for a Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament. He wrote a nine-page article in 1981
and a 1984 book with the same title, The Evolution of Cooperation, about the results. Decades
later, the article is still one of the most cited articles ever published in the journal Science
(Axelrod and W.D. Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984). Scores of game theoreticians continue to
test his findings under various computer, human, and laboratory conditions (for example, Betz,
1991; Busch and Reinhardt, 1993; Simpson, 2001a: 139-49; Kretz, 2011; Axelrod, 2012; Hilbe
C., Traulsen A., Sigmund K. 2015; Rapoport, Seale and Colman, 2015).
Axelrod first set up the tournament so that each computer program would interact with
other programs, and each program would be matched against itself, as well as against Random - a
program that randomly cooperated and defected with equal probability. In the first round-robin,
each game consisted of exactly two hundred moves, there were 14 separate strategies, and the

17

game was run five times so there were 240,000 separate choices. The strategy that won the
tournament, because it attained the highest average score compared to any other entry, was the
simplest of all the submitted programs. It was formulated by Rapoport. His strategy, Tit for Tat
(TFT), began with a cooperative choice and then did whatever the other player did on the
previous move. The reasons for the success of the strategy of TFT were that:
1. it was nice by starting off with cooperation;
2. it was retaliatory immediately in the case of defection - it defected once after each
defection by the other;
3. but it was forgiving if the adversary cooperated again
4. and it was not too clever, but it was very clear - consequently, it was easy for other
programs to figure out its strategy.

Then Axelrod ran another tournament. This time, however, all the participants knew TFT
had won the first round so many tried to design entries to beat TFT. Strategies such as Stab in the
Back defected on the last move; strategies such as Tester defected immediately; while
Tranquillizer lulled the other player into cooperation, and then tried to get away with defection.
In this tournament, Axelrod also remedied a problem arising out of the first round robin related to
the finite number of moves. He was able to more closely mirror reality by ensuring that minor
endgame effects were eliminated (e.g. in this round robin, the game did not end after 200 finite
moves; instead, the end of the game was probabilistic with a .00346 chance of ending the game
with each given move.)
In the second tournament, there were 63 different strategies, and more than a million
plays. There were many programs designed to be nice and forgiving; while other programs tried
to take advantage of others if they were nice and forgiving. Anyone could submit any program
but only one person submitted TFT again - Anatol Rapoport. To everyone’s surprise, TFT won
the tournament once more. Thus, the success of TFT led to some simple, but powerful advice:


Be nice;
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Practice reciprocity (e.g. cooperate if the other player cooperates but retaliate if they
defect);



Forgive;



Try to be as clear as possible
How might TFT be applied to international relations? First, if Group Leader A knows

that Group Leader B will be around for a long time in the foreseeable future, they might conclude
that it would be worthwhile to improve their long-term relationship. In game theoretical
language, ‘the shadow of the future’ looms larger in an iterated game. If there is no foreseeable
end to the relationship at all, adopting a Tit for Tat strategy can be even more fruitful (Simpson,
2001a: 139-49). For more than thirty years, in hundreds of publications, social and behavioral
scientists have propagated the conclusion that TFT is the appropriate strategy to follow in
resolving conflicts in dyadic interactions that satisfy the assumptions underlying the iterated twoperson PD game (Rapoport, Amman, 2015). “New strategies are developed and old ones are
reused in new areas. But basic rules for cooperation that were recognized by Axelrod in the first
competition are still valid” (p. 1097).

III. The Inherent Dangers of Game Theory and Nuclear Deterrence
Dr. Rapoport made very clear in his classes that game theory is replete with abstract language
and complicated numerical terms - concepts that can be used more to obfuscate than to clarify.
Just as the language of nuclear deterrence and strategic thought uses many complicated concepts
such as flexible response, bolstering and pre-emptive warfare (Simpson, 2001b, 2009), game
theoreticians have their own forbidding terms (e.g. Nash equilibria, pareto-optimal, non-zerosum games). Rapoport cautioned that those who use game theory can experience a kind of thrill
at being able to manipulate the language. And they can also mistakenly feel that they have
nuclear weapons under control. Game theory veils the choices facing humans about their survival
in innocuous quasi-mathematical language. By doing so, game theory desensitises policy-makers
and scholars to the reality of what they are talking about - which is actually about using weapons
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and force to threaten, deter, and kill other humans. As he emphasized, “Strategic science is what
confers intellectual respectability on the military profession, deflecting attention from the
concrete results of military activity - mass killing and destruction” (Rapoport, 1995: 169) For
example, he roundly berated one PhD candidate at the University of Toronto for asking a
question about game theory that betrayed a lack of respect for the reality of what we were talking
about - namely the US-Soviet nuclear stand-off that was holding billions of lives hostage during
the Cold War.
Dr. Rapoport taught generations of students’ game-theoretical styles of reasoning to
generate ideas about how to deal with the broad range of challenges to human security, such as
armed intra-state conflict, gross violations of human rights, environmental degradation, and
nuclear proliferation. He understood that for students, learning the language of game theory was
useful if we want to understand the abstractions of strategizing - much like mathematicians or
physicists have a shared language. A basic appreciation of game theory also helps to understand
the rather skewed assumptions about ‘rationality’ that underlie traditional military thinking about
deterrence strategy. Indeed, a basic grasp of game theory’s underlying assumptions and
oversimplifications helped me as a graduate student develop sufficient game-theoretical parlance
to ask uncomfortable questions of the proponents of game-theoretical deterrence, such as: “Can
we assume that decision-makers will act and make decisions rationally during a crisis, such as a
nuclear war?” (Simpson, 1990) Moreover, Rapoport showed how game theory can be useful for
generating creative strategies that can help cooperation emerge in a world without central
authority - that is, in a world of supposed ‘anarchy’. His strategy of TFT can be applied to a
myriad of interactions between leaders, groups, countries, alliances, and international
organizations. Taking remedial action - a Tit for Tat approach - based on game theoretical ideas
may (or may not) help reduce all types of conflict. Scholars continue to challenge the generality
of Rapoport’s strategy and point out that TFT is restricted to a particular combination tournament
format, criterion for success, and payoff values (Rapoport, Seale and Coleman, 2015).
Nevertheless, there is wide agreement that Dr. Anatol Rapoport made an enormous contribution

20

to game theory, strategic studies, and peace and conflict studies. He was one of North America’s
most pre-eminent scholars and his legacy will live on for generations of future scholars and
policy makers.
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Figure 1
“Chicken” or Deterrence Game

Ivan (column)
Don’t Swerve (threaten)

Swerve (cooperate)

Sam
(row)

+1

Swerve
(cooperate)

+1
Don’t Swerve
(threaten)

+10
-10

-10
+10

-100
-100
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Figure 2
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Arnold and Bob in Jail

Bob (B)
Cooperate (silence = C)
Cooperate
(silence = C)

B gets 1 year
(-10)
Both silent
(C, C)

Arnold (A)

A gets 1 year
(-10)
Defect
(confess = D)

B gets 10 years
(-100)
Arnold confesses,
Bob is silent
(D, C)
A gets 3 months
(-3)

-3 = ‘best’, most-preferred outcome
-10 = ‘next best’ or next-preferred outcome
-50 = ‘next worst’ outcome
-100 = ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome

Defect (confess = D)
B gets 3 months

Bob confesses,
Arnold is silent
(C, D)
A gets 10 years
(-100)
Bob gets 5 years
(-50)
Both confess
(D, D)
A gets 5 years
(-50)
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Figure 3
An Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma

Country B
Cooperate (low arms spending)
Cooperate
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Country B
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Defect (high arms spending)
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(C, C)
Arms Limitation

Country A
Country A
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(C, D)

Country A
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Country B
serious disadvantage
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Country B
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(D, C)
Country A
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(+50)
+50 = ‘best’, most-preferred outcome
-10 = ‘next best’ or next-preferred outcome
-50 = ‘next worst’ outcome
-100 = ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome

Country A
(-50)
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